Using the rise of the Chinese "shareholding state" as an example, this paper attempts to extend the study of financialization from the economy to the state. It documents a historical and institutional process in which the Chinese state refashioned itself as a shareholder and institutional investor in the economy and resorted to a set of financial means (in contrast to fiscal means) to manage its ownership, assets, and public investments. I focus on the emergence and expansion of the state asset management system in the past decade. Against this background, I show that an array of new corporate actors started to serve as a financial platform for the Chinese state to centralize capital control and finance public investment. I argue that this transformation speaks to the Chinese policy elites' profound effort in modernizing China's state-economy relations without conceding control over the economy. As a consequence, such financialization of state-economy relations changed the means of evaluating and financing industrial investments and industrial policies. Overall, by uncovering the mutually leveraging effect between sovereign power and finance which underpins the expansion of these state asset management bodies, my study illustrates a politically endogenous model of explaining the institutional route to the rise of finance in state-directed economies.
Introduction
Since the early 2000s, the exponential growth of financial markets and subsequent crises have spurred scholarly interests from a variety of disciplines which focus on the phenomenon of "financialization" (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000; Martin, 2002; Krippner, 2005 Krippner, , 2011 Froud, Johal, Leaver and Williams, 2006; Seabrooke, 2006; Davis, 2009; Schwartz, 2012; Prasad, 2012; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Zwan, 2014) .
Definition and measurement of financialization vary, but the "object" that is being "financialized" predominantly refers to either economies or societies. For example, Greta
Krippner's flagship research in this field measures financialization as both the growth of financial sector profits and the growing reliance of nonfinancial firms on financial activities in economies (Krippner, 2005; 2011: p28-29) . Gerald Davis discusses the emergence of "portfolio societies" within financial capitalism, in which the investment idiom becomes a dominant way of understanding individuals' place in society (Davis, 2009: 6-7) . The current literature has left out the state as an object of financialization.
States have invariably been portrayed as suppliers of regulation (and deregulation) policies who facilitate the financialization of economies (Fligstein, 2009; Carruthers and Kim, 2011) . Little attention has been paid to how states themselves can be actors in the financial market and how such activities will change the way states manage economies and conduct public investment.
In addition, most of our existing knowledge on financialization has been drawn from case studies of liberalized and developed economies (Jürgens 2000; Goyer 2006; Correa,Vidal and Marshall 2012) . Much less research has been done on less liberalized and developing ones; existing research has called our attention to the role of the state in the development of financial markets and provision of financial products (Akkemik and Özen, 2013) . In this regard, the world's second largest economy-China-presents an extreme statist case in which the state not only "directs" but "owns" the economy. Statecontrolled firms hold one half of total assets, produce one third of industrial outputs, and hire one fifth of China's employees. 1 Although the Chinese economy is not highly financialized 2 , however, financialization has become a growing method for economic management of the state. A narrow focus on financialization of the economy per se incorrectly presumes that the state and the market can be neatly separated, especially in an economy with a strong presence of state ownership and control. Given China's ostensible underdeveloped and underliberalized financial markets, the Chinese case has been left nearly untouched by the literature on financialization.
I define financialization of economic management in the Chinese context as a process in which the state increasingly refashions itself as a shareholder and institutional investor in the economy and resorts to a set of financial means (financial market, financial indicators, and financial instruments), in contrast to fiscal means, to manage its 1 Data from "OECD Economic Surveys: China" published in March 2013 and The Yearbook of Industrial Economy in China, 2012, p19 2 For example, market capitalization of listed companies in China is 44.9% of GDP in 2012, this number for the US in the same year is 114.9%. Gross value added of the financial sector in China is 5%, this number for the US is above 8%. Bank capital to asset ratio is 6.3 in China and 11.8% in the US. Sources: World bank ownership, assets, and public investments. The "shareholding state" and its state asset management bodies are the central actors in financializing the state/economy relations.
State asset management entities emerged to represent the shareholding state and corporatized the management of massive state assets. Because of their easy access to financial licenses and state-backed cheap credits, these state asset management entities morphed into institutional banks and financing vehicles for state-led investment. This paper is a historical institutional account of the causes and consequences of the emergence of China's state asset management system.
By explaining why the state asset management institutions proliferated so rapidly, I intend to disclose a mutually reinforcing effect between sovereign power and financialization. At the core of this underpinning relationship, the sovereign (or semisovereign) status of state asset management entities granted them government guarantees and cheap cost of borrowing which encouraged debt and leveraged financing. The interlocking institutional ties and interests among these state actors constructed the institutional foundation of this kind of endogenous "sovereign risk". Researchers can view the Chinese case as a controlled experiment in which the state acts as a variable that can affect the financial market parameter, including the composition of actors, the evaluation of risk, the structure of products, etc.
In the following space, I will first discuss recent literature on the rise of finance, briefly introduce the significance of state asset management bodies in China, and explain the merits of a historical-institutional approach to studying this question. I then proceed to date the origin of financialization to the 1990s when shareholding reform of Stateowned enterprises (SOEs) began. I foreground the instrumental role that the "Integrated
Reform School" played in discovering the financial mechanism of state control when conducting shareholding reform. I then map the emergence of the organizational field of state asset management and explain how these initially passive owners transformed into active institutional investors. The second part of the paper assesses the economic and political impact of financialization on industrial investment. It argues that industrial investments under the financial model by state asset management platforms became desectorialized and depoliticized and fixed asset investments were increasingly financed by structured products such as securitization. The last part of the paper concludes and discusses the general implication of the Chinese case.
State and Financialization: Introducing the Chinese case
Politically sensitive research on financialization has paid considerable attention to the role of the state (Davis, 2009; Fligstein, 2009; Krippner, 2012) . Through regulations and maneuvering market levers such as interest rates and exchange rates, states aimed to shape market outcome and create political effects. However, under existing theoretical frameworks that are tailored towards explaining liberal economies, states are categorized as external policy makers rather than direct participants of the financial market. A few studies are beginning to redress this omission and explore the endogenous role of the state in the development of financial markets (Davis, 2009:154-190; Pacewicz 2012; Quinn, 2010 Quinn, , 2014 . Scholars have shown that states can be active participants in financial markets and even forefront innovators of financialization. In coping with budget deficits, both U.S. federal and local governments invented and mobilized financial technologies to finance public welfare programs and local development projects (Pacewicz, 2012; Quinn, 2010 Quinn, , 2014 . Government-sponsored Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac housing programs owe their creation to the U.S.'s longstanding economic political tradition of relying on credit to individualize public welfare (Prasad, 2012; Quinn, 2014) .
The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party from the 1930s until the 1990s used a Fiscal Investment Loan Plan to avoid budget constraints and to mobilize credit for financing public investments and the welfare state (Park, 2011 Existing research on China's asset management companies is merely interested in these companies' overseas investment and provide only vignettes of individual corporations (Eaton and Zhang, 2010; Shih, 2009 They play the same function of reorganizing the state's asset (bundle and invest in them as shares), and possess similar advantage points in the financial system (equity investment and debt financing). Their emergence has nudged the state's role from one of domination through administrative directives and supervision to that of management through shareholding. 
Mechanisms of State Control
In the early period of China's economic reform, SOE reforms predominantly consisted of increasing the power of managers rather than restructuring ownerships.
Throughout the 1980s, the deterioration of SOEs' performance was prevailingly interpreted as a managerial problem. To grant incentives to SOE managers, Chinese reformers implemented a profit contract system to decentralize administrative control over SOEs and encourage market-oriented productions. Foreign experiences was pertinent under the managerialist framework on account of their "advanced management methods" (Li 1981; Yuan, 1991 (Wu et al, 1988 ) that became the key architect of China's shareholding reform and state asset management system. "Integrated Reform School" (IRS) was a self-organized policy advocacy group, consisting of state think tank researchers and junior officials, mostly associated with the People's Bank of China (PBOC, also known as China's Central Bank). They were committed to adopting the world's best institutional practices and building up a "modern" economy for China; at the same time, they saw no contradiction between state ownership and marketization. They accused the earlier decentralization reform approaches as amounting to putting up "a tax-farming system of the 18 th century Europe" (Wu et al, 1988) . Sidelined in the 1980s, IRS made a comeback through their personal ties and intellectual affinity with the post-1989 leadership, especially Premier Zhu Rongji.
IRS argued that the absence of the owner and vaguely defined owner's rights and incentives were major problem sources of SOEs' plight (Wu and Qian 1993; Zhou, Lou and Li, 1994; Wu and Xie, 1994) . The documentation of ownership for SOEs was terribly unclear even though SOEs were doubtlessly "owned" by the state; state ownership often came with vaguely defined obligations and responsibilities. IRS's solution was to institute shareholding reform so that shareholders' rights, including the state's, would be safeguarded. Shareholders would have an incentive to discipline managers and demand good corporate performance.
IRS certainly was not the only observers of SOE's problem from the perspective of owners, but it was the most coherent group rising from the state that was able to supply the post-1989 leadership with renewed theoretical justification and concrete institutional contour of state-controlled economic reforms. Exporting Western practice of corporate governance and agency theory through US-based Chinese economist such as Qian Yingyi, IRS universalized and neutralized them for the socialist context. They argued that Chinese SOEs were suffering from their own version of the "insider control problem" which prevailed in the age of "big corporations" in liberal economies. This problem was particularly acute in a socialist economy because state ownership was neither personified nor clearly documented. They encouraged the state to exercise shareholder activism and to discipline the managers. To this purpose, they emphasized that the corporate governance mechanism was quintessential to modern corporations. Corporate boards and board meetings were the essential institutional venues where shareholders' interests and rights were exercised (Wu and Qian 1993) . Overall, IRS depoliticized shareholding, presenting it as a universal trend of socializing capital and ensuring the rights of investors (Zhou, Lou, and Li 1994) . Through meetings and personnel connections with the leadership, they seized every opportunity to hammer their ideas home. In 1997, President
Jiang Zemin, clearly convinced, reported to the National Congress that shareholding ought to be the official guidelines for SOE reform. He asserted, "shareholding system is an efficient way of organizing capital. Capitalism uses it. Socialist can use it too" (Jiang, 2006) . By 1998, 84.8% of state-owned industrial firms had been corporatized and reconstituted with corporate governance structures (Zhou and Zhang, 2005: 14) .
Shareholding certainly was not a new intellectual invention of the 1990. In the mid-1980s, capital-hungry SOEs were already converting themselves into joint-stock corporations, introducing funding from both foreign and private sources. Shareholding played a significant role in diversifying ownership and thus diluting the state's share of capital. It was an economic necessity rather a choice for both the cash-striped SOEs to invite investment and for the state to "let go" of the small and inefficient companies.
Some observers thus asserted that shareholding reform was "a Chinese way of privatization", pointing to the plummeting number of industrial SOEs from 120000 in the mid-1990s to 31750 in 2004 during the peak of corporatization (Ma 2010) .
A careful examination of the early designs of the shareholding system and the set of the leadership's concerns surrounding shareholding reform, however, would suggest that shareholding reform actually increased the state's financial control which convinced the leadership to officially roll out with these reforms nationwide. The concern was more on how to "grasp the large" rather than "let go of the small", as stated in the official guideline of SOE reform in 1995. IRS pointed out in their meeting with the State Economic and Trade Commission (the cardinal agency of economic policy making under Premier Zhu Rongji) that capital control through shareholding arrangement would be a highly efficacious type of state control. As long as the state kept majority stakes in strategic sectors, it would not only continuously enjoy the rights of the largest shareholder but would also be able to absorb and "leverage" funds of private sources,, much larger than the size of its own contribution, through the capital market. Such kind of unmediated financing would likely be more expedient than through savings and loans at traditional banks; SOEs would effectively tap into the growing national surplus. IRS's key member, Guo Shuqing, urged the leadership to update their notion of state control, arguing that the state's control in the age of finance was not measured by the amount of capital which it directly controlled, but by the leverage and influence that the state's capital would be able to command (Guo, 2008) . Building up the Shareholding State: the Rise of "Institutional Owners" and the
Organizational Field of State Asset Management
One prerequisite for corporatizing SOEs was to convert the state's contribution into shares. Under socialist economies, state ownership was financially manifested in the forms of grants, funds, physical assets, and loans. Since 1979, to reduce SOEs' reliance on the state's "soft budget", government appreciation for SOEs was replaced with bank credits. SOEs' easy access to bank credits throughout the 1980s resulted in an alarming 62% debt-to-asset ratio at industrial SOEs (Zou, 2008: 351) . 4 Debt became the major obligations of SOEs to the state in the early 1990s. However, with the low profitability of these companies and their imprudent use of cheap credit, a large proportion of the loans turned sour. In 2000, the four largest state banks recorded 30% Non-Performing Loans (NPL) (Hu, 2004: 55) . Bad loans were a major obstacle for SOEs to optimize their capital structures; they would certainly look bad on the books and bring down the evaluation of both SOEs and state banks when either one tried to go public. To dispose of bad loans, the state had three options: fiscal injection, writing them off, or debt-to-equity swap. IRS suggested to the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC, the overarching economic decision making body then) in 1994 that fiscal solutions of dealing with bad loans-writing them off or fiscal injection-was no longer sustainable given the dropping tax revenues of the central state. Converting these non-performing loans into share capital can improve the asset quality of state banks without billing the national budget. By careful calculation, IRS' leading advocate, Zhou Xiaochuan (the current Governor of PBOC), then a PBOC researcher, was confident that the total sum of state asset, after debt-to-equity swap, would not shrink (Zhou and Wang, 1994) . The 1997
Asian Financial Crisis jolted the leadership and prompted their determination to overhaul the Chinese banking system and face SOE's NPL problems. In 2000, SETC officially rolled out the debt-to-equity program nationwide. At the same time, shareholding reform was finishing its last strokes with other types of governmental contributions such as funds and physical assets were appraised and converted. State ownership was finally represented by a common denominator-equities.
As the state ownership became economically legible, the ensuing issue was to monitor the state assets on behalf of the shareholder state. In 2003, the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established against the backdrop of a new wave of public criticism of state asset loss during unmonitored and predatory privatization. SASAC, an administrative agency under the state council, was 4 The ratio was 75% in the construction sector and 98% in trade in1998, Hu, 2004:7. made to be the "sole representative of state ownership" designated to "perform the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China-by transferring them to a co-managed 5 Therefore, shareholding reform also provided an opportunity to raise capital on the domestic and international market. The concern regarding enhancing Chinese banks' credit analysis, risk management, corporate management and subjecting them to the shareholder discipline and international scrutiny was also genuine (Walter and Howie 2011, 143 In other words, the banks will be paying themselves back for MOF's initial "investment".
This amounted to a splendid exercise of "leveraged buyout"; an ingenious way for the MOF to ensure its shareholder stakes in these banks. Table 1 presented the end result of this round of competition. into every conceivable area of China's financial universe as well, including securities, private equity, leasing, credit guarantee, rating agency, and numerous financing platforms of local governments (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013 ). CBD's first international move was made with its acquisition of 3.1% stake in Barclays. 16 It has also acted as an indispensible investment partner with Chinese SOEs in Latin American and Africa (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013) .
There is a convergent trend in which these above holding institutions have become China's state-owned "Goldman Sacks" and "JP Morgan", in spite of themselves.
Without the central coordination from their ultimate principal -the state -these corporate agents acted like "normal" market actors, acquiring as much as they could of China's newly tradable state assets, knowing that gaining a foothold in the blooming financial market was an exigent priority.
If we scrutinized the source of new capital that these state asset management bodies raised, a more profound linkage between sovereign power and finance can be disclosed. The sovereign or semi-sovereign status of these state-owned institutions helped from their own bond issuing. In 2010, Huijin issued $31 billion long-term bonds to capitalize the struggling The Export-Import Bank of China and China Export-Credit Insurance Corporation to prepare for their corporatization. CBD was explicitly made to be independent of the national budget after corporatization; funding itself through debt issuance in the interbank market. Currently, CBD is the second largest bond-issuer in China, second only to the Ministry of Finance.
Because of the semi-sovereign status of these corporate entities, bonds they issued were treated as sovereign bonds. Their interest rates were kept artificially as low as treasury bonds. International rating agencies typically pegged the ratings of their bonds to those issued by the Ministry of Finance. By issuing bonds to acquire equities, these state agencies exercised what is equivalent to "leveraged buyout", copying from MOF's playbook when it acquired the state banks. Leveraged buyout is a common financial strategy at the exposal of private equities when making large acquisitions. For lack of better a term, international observers dubbed the Chinese state-backed investment funds "public equity" (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013: 31) . "Public equity" apparently bears a different type of risk. Since both Huijin and CBD's bonds were purchased by state-owned commercial banks, the risk was kept "inside of the system" (Walter and Howie, 2011: 151) . The ostensible market operation of the state business obscured the fact that the debt merely changed hand between a few state players. In this way, risk is collectively hedged and fundamentally underwritten by the sovereign state; default was remote.
Consequences: The Financialization of Government Investment and Industrial

Policies
Existing literature on the financialization of the industrialized world indicates that financialization, measured by the increased source of financial revenues for non-financial firms, has an effect of further de-industrializing national output. However, in China, where industrialization is still a work-in-progress, the resort to financial market altered the way in which industrial investment of the state was undertaken rather than depressing it. In fact, China's gross capital formation, an indicator of a nation's fixed asset investment, has steadily climbed from 35% of GDP in 2000 to 49% in 2012 (source: The World Bank). The 2009 stimulus package, of which three-fourth went to infrastructure construction, ratcheted up capital formation since 2009 even more. The state asset management system has become an important institutional vehicle for state-led investment. At these financial platforms, state ownership was bundled, which to a great extent has obscured sectorial origins and identities of industrial capital. On these platforms, financial perspectives and interests to industrial investment were assembled. It transformed the politics of previously sector-based industrial policies.
These institutions also provided a non-banking source of credit expansion for infrastructure investment with highly structured financial instruments. Financial innovation, in contrast to diverting capital from fixed asset investment, facilitated longterm investment in China even though at the same time it was responsible for the growing government debt from credit-financing public investments. I will discuss these two ways in which industrial investments have been financialized in the space below.
State asset management bodies tapped into new sources of knowledge and skills for the state to manage its economy. I alluded to how financialization has prompted fiscal institutions, primarily the Ministry of Finance, to join the shareholding race and stake out its own share of financial entrepreneurship. 17 The changing investment mottos and methods in the industrial sector is probably the strongest test to the rising primacy of financial management. It is because the physical and sectorial way of organizing assets in industrial investment, thanks in part to the institutional legacy of a planned economy, appeared the remotest from the one of financial investment.
Industrial investors in socialist economies were planners located in the industrial ministries. Industrial ministries in China were divided firmly along sectorial lines, such as the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, the Ministry of Electronic Industry, the Ministry of Textile Industry and so forth. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, industrial ministries were gradually abolished and restructured into SOEs, however, the sectorial division of labor remained. Chinese SOEs tended to be vertically integrated and specialized rather than multidivisional (Chen, 2009: 130) . The second way in which the state asset management system financialized industrial investment is that state asset management bodies have become financing vehicles for infrastructure-related government investment. Some products these financing vehicles provided are highly structured. In fact, state asset management bodies are now China's largest providers of securitized products. CBD securitized 2 billion (US$) loans held by China Railway Corporation, the largest securitized product in China's history, to "solicit financial institutions' support of railway investment reform". 24 Local governments were even more uninhibited and entrepreneurial in relying on state asset management "platforms" (pingtai) to assemble structured investment vehicles. According to a survey by the National Audit Office in 2013, there were 7170 "local financing platforms" (difang rongzi pingtai) nationwide and 40% of local governmental debts was issued by these corporate entities. These "platforms" have hosted an incredible variety of financing schemes such as bonds, short-term commercial papers and securitization products. The word "platform" in its all vagueness well captured the all-in-one functions of these local asset management bodies.
The financialization of public investment by local governments speaks again to the trade-off between budget and credit as two sources of financing public investment.
China's local governments are responsible for 80% of government spending while receiving only half of the nation's fiscal revenue. 25 To counter the fiscal plight, cashstrapped local governments had to borrow to invest in infrastructure building and urbanization. State asset management companies of local governments mined a large range of state assets and used them as collaterals to take out loans. Land represents the most promising site of collateral mining because the real estate boom of the past two decades has exponentially increased the value of urban land. Land in China is all owned by the state but the sale of land leasing rights belongs to the local governments. Backed by the expected income streams provided by these public assets (mortgaged public lands, the leasing of public facilities or even tax revenues), local governments leveraged their borrowing. State-owned commercial banks helped repackaged local debts and sold them as "wealth management products" to retail consumers. In June 2013, local government debt has hit $2.95 trillion; 37% were backed by land sales. The question of the relationship between state and finance will certainly invite global attention as we find that Chinese state asset managers' ambitions are carried beyond national boundaries as they are ready to invest globally. Debates about this newphenomenon revolves around the geopolitical motives of the unified state. This paper however unpacks the state and argues that the Chinese shareholding state is not monolithic. State investors are embedded in competitive organizational fields. Their
